{
  "type": "findings/v1",
  "subject": "ci:github-actions-runner",
  "profile": "github/actions-runner/ci",
  "tool": "the job's shell",
  "measured_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
  "measured_by": {
    "who": "the measure-grant workflow running measure.py inside the runner \u2014 the instrument IS the subject",
    "independence": "self",
    "identity_record": null,
    "runner": "packs/grant-and-mandate/tools/measure.py, translated into findings/v1 by hand on 2026-09-05 from packs/grant-and-mandate/library/github-actions-runner__ci__2026-08-26.json (the library's second entry); the translation is the only thing dated today"
  },
  "environment": {
    "platform": "Linux",
    "machine": "x86_64",
    "note": "an ephemeral CI runner, one job, one date"
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "probe": "identity.account",
      "message": "runs as uid 1001; passwordless escalation available (n1a) \u2014 programs run as this user and can escalate",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "execute.process.host",
      "reversible": "with-effort",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "uid": 1001,
        "passwordless_escalation": true,
        "note": "n1 records the OS user separation as a boundary; n1a records that sudo -n succeeds, so the boundary is stepped over for free"
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "identity.account",
      "message": "the runner's user with passwordless escalation: every file on the ephemeral machine",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "read.file.host",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "uid": 1001,
        "passwordless_escalation": true
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "identity.account",
      "message": "the runner's user with passwordless escalation: every file on the ephemeral machine",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "write.file.host",
      "reversible": "with-effort",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "uid": 1001,
        "passwordless_escalation": true
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "identity.account",
      "message": "the runner's user with passwordless escalation: every file on the ephemeral machine",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "delete.file.host",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "uid": 1001,
        "passwordless_escalation": true
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "filesystem.credential-presence",
      "message": "no credential-shaped paths found at the usual locations",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "read.credential.host",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "filesystem.credential-presence",
      "message": "nothing found to infer from",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "authenticate-as.credential.tenant",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "inferred",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "filesystem.history-presence",
      "message": "no retained session record found at the usual paths",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "read.record.history",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "network.egress-shell",
      "message": "github.com 200, pypi.org 200, example.com 200 \u2014 UNRESTRICTED egress, no proxy",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "send.endpoint.world",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "reach": [
          {
            "host": "github.com",
            "http": "200",
            "reachable": true
          },
          {
            "host": "pypi.org",
            "http": "200",
            "reachable": true
          },
          {
            "host": "example.com",
            "http": "200",
            "reachable": true
          }
        ],
        "proxied": false
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "network.egress-shell",
      "message": "no allow-list is in force",
      "outcome": "NotApplicable",
      "capability": "send.endpoint.allowed",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "vcs.remote-hooks-signing",
      "message": "the checked-out tree at this ref is writable by the job",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "write.repository.project",
      "reversible": "with-effort",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "ci.permissions-block",
      "message": "bounded by the workflow's permissions block \u2014 contents:read and nothing else, so the token cannot write to the repository, publish, or dispatch another workflow; set above the job by something the job cannot edit (a BOUNDARY)",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "write.repository.tenant",
      "reversible": "with-effort",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z",
      "values": {
        "workflow": "measure-grant",
        "repository": "SGit-AI/SGit-AI__Website__PKI",
        "permissions": "contents: read"
      }
    },
    {
      "probe": "vcs.remote-hooks-signing",
      "message": "no signing key in the runner",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "authenticate-as.credential.signing",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "agent.config-presence",
      "message": "no agent harness in a CI job; not established",
      "outcome": "NotAvailable",
      "capability": "grant.credential.self",
      "reversible": "yes",
      "tier": "unknown",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "schedule.persistence",
      "message": "the machine is destroyed after the job, so nothing persists between runs except what is deliberately uploaded",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "create.schedule.host",
      "reversible": "yes",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "vcs.remote-hooks-signing",
      "message": "the checked-out tree at this ref is readable \u2014 including anything a contributor committed by mistake",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "read.file.project",
      "reversible": "yes",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "vcs.remote-hooks-signing",
      "message": "the checked-out tree at this ref is writable by the job",
      "outcome": "True",
      "capability": "write.file.project",
      "reversible": "with-effort",
      "tier": "observed",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    },
    {
      "probe": "filesystem.credential-presence",
      "message": "no package-registry token at the usual locations",
      "outcome": "False",
      "capability": "create.record.world",
      "reversible": "no",
      "tier": "inferred",
      "observed_at": "2026-08-26T00:00:00Z"
    }
  ],
  "not_measured": [
    "what the job could reach with a token of wider scope \u2014 the block was contents:read",
    "anything a later workflow step could do"
  ],
  "disclaimer": "PRESENCE AND REACHABILITY, NEVER CONTENTS.",
  "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
}